Introduction
In developing countries, the number of children in poor households may tighten constraints on intra-household allocation of resources (Garg and Morduch, 1998) [13] . A competition between children for available resources is likely to result from such constraints. This competition can express itself by a discrimination between children on the basis of nutrition or health care (Behrman, 1988) [3] . Another dimension of intra-houshold discrimination regards the access to schooling and child labor (Basu & Van, 1998) [2] . If resources become scarce, parents may send some of children to work and others to attend school and concentrate on studying.
Economics research on the determinants of this discrimination in the domain of child labor and school attendance are vivid. Yet, the question of what factors a¤ect households'decision to send a child to the labor market or to school is not fully elaborated. The specialization of children based on gender or "gender bias", has been observed in a large empirical literature on child labor and schooling in African countries (Dar et al, 2000) [7] . It is observed that girls are less likely to attend school than boys. In this paper, we investigate the potential role of birth order in this specialization process. The underlying question we want to study is whether birth order may be a factor through which this discrimination between children arises, and if so, in favor of which child ?
The role of the birth order has been investigated in several studies. Until recently, the common view in the empirical literature was that parents invest more in the education of the …rst child. Several arguments support this conclusion. The fact -which has been pointed out by the psychological literature -that earlier born children have higher IQ's and cognitive abilities is one of them. 1 The economic implication of this fact is that parents may want to invest more resources in the education of the child with the greatest return to education. The hypothesis that birth order may a¤ect parents' allocation choices also stems from the fact that …rst born children are favored for cultural factors (Horton, 1988) [14] . Because parents need security in old age, they will invest more in the education of the …rst born children because they will become economically independent …rst.
In recent theoretical and empirical contributions, this view is being challenged: later born children seem to be favored (more educated) than earlier born children. Ejrnaes & Pörtner (2004) [10] claim that this new conclusion can be reached once the endogeneity of fertility choices is properly taken into account. The theory they present to back up this result is based on a combination of uncertainty about the ability of the children to be born and the taste of parents for their o¤spring's human capital and their aversion for inequality between children. The intuition is the following: since the stopping rule (on the decision of having children) depends on the last child's potential return to education, last born children are more likely to be successful at school.
In this paper, we formalize the idea that when parents are credit constrained, they can be forced to send their ealier born children to work. Our model accounts explicitly for the dynamics of birth order and shows how the latter interacts with credit constraints. Apart from being born (and as a result becoming productive) at di¤erent moments, all children have the same potential return to education and labor productivity. The importance of taking into account a dynamic perspective over the household is that it highlights a simple fact: di¤erent periods are characterized by di¤erent family sizes, di¤erent levels of pressure over resources and di¤erent numbers of potential child laborers. 2 The dynamic perspective is also important in the sense that the choice of discriminating one child in one period has repercussions over the next periods. The intuition behind our result is that when the pressure on household budget becomes very tight, that is when all children are born, only earlier born children can be sent to work to generate additional income and soften budget constraints. 3 Our results can be stated in the following way. As long as a household's optimal savings are strictly positive, i.e. it is not credit constrained, all children receive the same education level. On the other hand, if a household faces credit constraints the …rstborn child works more and receives less education than her younger sibling. The latter ends up with a higher level of human capital. The main prediction of our model is that in "poor" households (that are credit-constrained), the elder children end up with a relatively lower level of human capital and "rich" households do not discriminate between their children on the basis of birth order and all children reach the same human capital level.
To our knowledge, our model is the …rst one to take explicitly into account the order of birth and to show how it interacts with credit constraints. Papers by Emerson & Souza (2002) [11] and Edmonds (2006) [9] have studied this question both theoretically and empirically and reach the same conclusions as Ejrnaes & Pörtner (2004) [10] . These two papers study households behaviour in a static context where children potentially di¤er in innate ability and labor productivity. 4 Implicitly, birth order is represented through these two characteristics. This modelling strategy generates general arbitrage conditions on the optimal allocation of schooling and child labor on the basis of innate ability and productivity, but fails to identify explicitly the role of birth order. For instance, it neither incorporates the fact that each child is born at di¤erent moments and becomes productive in di¤erent economic environments, nor shows how credit constraints play a role in this precise context. We test the model's predictions on the 2001 Cameroon Household Survey database. Our empirical strategy is to analyse the stock of human capital rather than a short term information about whether he/she is registered in a school on the year of the survey. Our dependant variable is an "educational zscore" which compares the number of completed grades of a child to the median of all children of the same age. Controlling for household …xed e¤ects, gender and age, our results con…rm that later-born children's educational levels are relatively higher. Furthermore, we observe no discrimination within wealthier households. These results are robust to alternative de…nitions of birth order, indicators of wealth, and other robustness checks.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a simple model in which households allocate labor and education between children born at di¤erent periods. In Section 3, we present the data, including our measures of birth order and the empirical model. Estimation results and their interpretations follow in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The model
The household is composed of one parent and two children i 2 f1; 2g. 5 The parent lives for 2 periods p 2 f1; 2g and there is no discounting of the future by any agent. Children live two periods -childhood and adolescence-inside the household, then become adults and leave it. During her …rst period in the household, a child is fully dependant, i.e. she can neither study nor work. In her second period in the household however, the child becomes -what we call-an adolescent and is endowed with one unit of productive time that parents decide to allocate between labor l i and schooling e i = 1 l i . Children leave the household at the end of adolescence. When inside the household, child i consumes k units of the numeraire good at each period. Parents supply their own labor inelastically and parental labor has y e¢ ciency units in each period, while child labor productivity is constant and equal to 1. Child labor revenues contribute to household income. The timing of our model is the following: at period 1, child 1 is already an adolescent while child 2 is still in childhood. Child 1 leaves the household at the end of period 1. At period 2, child 2 becomes an adolescent. At the end of period 2, child 2 leaves the household and the parent dies. Adult children earnings depend on the acquired level of human capital through the time spent at school. The human capital technology is denoted H(e) : [0; 1] ! R + . We will use extensively the following notations:
@e j e i for all i 2 f1; 2g. Children who spent all their childhood working have a single e¢ ciency unit of labor as an adult: H(0) = 1. The marginal return to schooling time is strictly positive (H 0 > 0) and strictly decreasing (H 00 < 0). The adult child's income W (H) = H allows her to consume H units of the numeraire good. Child i's utility is noted V (H i ). Parental utility is denoted (c 1 ; c 2 ; V (H 1 ); V (H 2 )) where c 1 and c 2 are parental consumption levels for respectively periods 1 and 2. is assumed separable so that
where both U ( ) and V ( ) are continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave functions and 2 [0; 1] is a parameter measuring parental altruism towards children. Again, we will make use of the following notations:
@H j H i for all i 2 f1; 2g. 5 In this simple version of the model, we consider the number of children as exogenous.
Apart from choosing their children's labor times l i for all i 2 f1; 2g, parents decide whether to transfer income across periods through savings s. Capital markets are imperfect, so that savings are non negative. Parents start period 1 with an exogenous initial wealth level W coming from previous savings or bequests. Therefore, they face the following budget constraints:
We assume that there exist interior optimum levels of child labour l 1 , l 2 for which the …rst order conditions are respectively:
The …rst order conditions with respect to s is:
The optimal level of savings is
. Therefore, savings will be interior only if W and/or child discrimination at the expense of the …rst born are su¢ ciently large.
Proposition 1 If household wealth is su¢ ciently high (W > k), s is interior and birth order does not a¤ ect schooling and child labor decisions. Children receive the same level of education: e 1 = e 2 . If on the contrary, household wealth is too low (W k), birth order does a¤ ect schooling and child labor decisions. The …rst born child receives less education than the second born: e 1 < e 2 . However, child discrimination tends to decrease as wealth increases and the need for liquidity decreases: at equilibrium, e 2 e 1 < k W .
Proof. Let us start by analysing the case where W > k. Let us consider three classes of optimum candidates, namely l 1 = l 2 , l 1 > l 2 and l 1 < l 2 . We need to show that only l 1 = l 2 can yield an optimal allocation. Consider …rst the case where l 1 > l 2 . This implies that optimal savings,
, are strictly positive. Consequently, (6) , (4) and (5) 
Since both V ( ) and H( ) are continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave functions, V 0 H 0 (e) is a strictly decreasing function of e. Indeed,
implies that e 1 = e 2 and we have a contradiction. Consider the second case where l 1 < l 2 . Two possibilities emerge: either
, in which case we have a contradiction for the same reasons as those shown above, or
< 0, which implies that savings are at a corner. In the latter scenario, (7), (4) and (5) 
As shown above, this inequality holds if and only e 1 < e 2 , which contradicts with l 1 < l 2 . Finally, if l 1 = l 2 , optimal savings, W k 2 , are strictly positive. Consequently, by (6) , (4) and (5)
The latter equality holds if and only if e 1 = e 2 , or equivalently, l 1 = l 2 . Let us now study the case where W k. Again, let us consider three classes of optimum candidates, namely l 1 = l 2 , l 1 > l 2 and l 1 < l 2 . We need to show that only l 1 > l 2 can yield an optimal allocation. Consider …rst the case where l 1 < l 2 .
< 0, which implies that savings are at a corner. (7), (4) and (5) 
As shown above, this inequality holds if and only e 1 < e 2 , which contradicts with l 1 < l 2 . Consider the second case where l 1 = l 2 . Since W k 2 0, savings are at a corner. Consequently, by (7), (4) and (5), e 1 > e 2 and we have a contradiction. Finally, if l 1 > l 2 , two possibilities emerge. Either
> 0 or less discrimination at the expense of the …rst born occurs so that
> 0, savings are interior, which by (6), (4) and (5), implies e 1 = e 2 and we have a contradiction. On the contrary, if
< 0 (which is equivalent to e 2 e 1 < k W ), savings are at a corner, which by (7), (4) and (5), implies e 1 < e 2 , or equivalently,
The intuition behind proposition 1 is that when parents are su¢ ciently rich so that they are not liquidity constrained in period 1, they are able to allocate similarly the time of their two children between schooling and working. More precisely, all children spend the same time at school and at work regardless of the period where they are productive. When the household faces liquidity constraints, period 1 savings are at a corner. At period 1, the pressure on resources is important compared to period 2: in the …rst one, two children consume but only one is able to bring resources to the household, while only one child consumes at period 2. This leads the household to make the …rst born child work more.
3 The data and the empirical model
The data
We use data from the second Survey on Cameroonian Households (SCH) conducted in 2001. It includes an extensive household questionnaire. The survey was part of the "Poverty data improvement" component of a partnership project for growth and poverty reduction established between Cameroon and the World Bank. It consists of nearly 11,000 urban and rural households drawn to form a representative sample of the whole country. The survey gathers information over about 57,000 individuals. We focus on those who are aged between 6 and 18 years old and are living in households where the eldest child is 18. This subsample consists of 6,452 individuals from about 2,560 households.
It is important to recognize that because the data used here is based on a household survey, it may not take into account the fact that some children may no longer live with their parents. In our sample, the age di¤erence between two children of consecutive birth order is in general smaller than 3 (80% of cases) and the median is 2, while the national median is around 2.5. 6 This suggests that the information we use to construct our birth order measures is reasonably cleaned of measurement errors due to the phenomenon of migrating children. We also implicitly assume that households do not have a child of more than 18 living elsewhere. In the estimation part, we check the robustness of our results on a subsample where households did not face migratory ‡ows over the last 5 years.
We use three di¤erent measures of the order of birth. The …rst one is a set of dummy variables: one for the …rstborn, one for the second-born and a third one for the third-born. We use only three dummy variables because the birth order of only 13% of children in the sample is higher or equal to 4. The second measure is the absolute birth order (Horton, 1988) [14] . The value for the absolute birth order of the …rstborn child is one, that of the second-child is 2 and so forth. Most of the variation in this measure is due to larger families. The third measure is the relative birth order (Behrman, 1988) [3] . It is de…ned as r 1 n 1 where r is the absolute order of birth and n the number of children in the household. The relative birth order of the …rst-born is zero and that of the last-born is 1, irrespective of the number of children. 7 The relative birth order for a given child can be interpreted as the share of elder siblings he/she has in the household.
Most children under 18 are at school. They are still in the process of accumulating human capital and we do not know what would be their …nal educational attainment in the future. Hence the current level of education is not a suitable indicator of the human capital of these children. The dependant variable in our regression will instead be a standardized education level (zscore). This zscore of a child is de…ned as
where EL i;j is the current education level (measured by the number of completed years of education) of a child i in household j, age is a reference education level of children of his/her age and age measures the dispersion of the education of children around the reference value. The zscore expresses the divergence of the education level of a child from the median education level of children of his/her age, standardized by a spread measure. In the nutritional status literature, international reference values are used. In our case, such reference out of sample values are not available. Consequently, we construct these references from our data. We choose to de…ne age as the median education level of children of a given age and age as the interquartile interval of education levels of children of the same age. Given our sample size, these values are not sensitive to the education level of a single child. 8 6 >From the "Enquête Démographique et de Santé, Cameroun 2004" [8] . 7 This de…nition is more interesting because it is not sensitive to the number of children, which may be an issue as long as the latter is considered endogenous. Birth order, or sibling composition, is the realization of parent's fertility decision and is likely to be correlated with unobserved characteristics of the households. Indeed parents decisions on fertility, education and child labor are simultaneously determined through a dynamic structure (Cigno & Rosati, 2000) [6], (Baland & Robinson, 2000) [1]). In particular, Ejrnaes & Pörtner (2004) [10] study the impact of birth order on schooling focusing on the endogeneity of fertility choices. 8 A more common de…nition of the zscore is the diversion of the variable of interest from its
The main prediction of Section 2 is that in poor households, …rstborn children have reached a smaller education level compared to later-borns, while this discrimination does not occur in wealthier households. Figure (3.1) gives a …rst indicator supporting this distinction by wealth. It presents the average zscores of children from poor and non-poor households by birth order. 9;10 It indicates that on average, in poor families, being among the earlier born children seems to strongly deteriorate their education level (relative to the reference of their age), while fourth borns and later borns do not seem to su¤er from this comparison anymore. In richer households, this discrimination appears to be very small (the average slope of the curve is very ‡at, and much ‡atter than that of poor households). Furthermore, all children from richer families appear to have signi…cantly the same education level as their reference. 11 Households have at most 8 children aged between 6 and 18 years. There may however be more children inside the household, since these statistics do not take into account children who are less than 6. The latter phenomenon explains the relatively low values for the average absolute and relative birth orders, as well as the large proportion of …rst and second born children (respectively 0.4 and 0.3). Boys and girls are almost represented in the same proportions. The average age is 11. The number of completed years of education is comprised between 0 and 14, with an average of 3.3 and a standard deviation of 2.9. The number of juniors also encompasses the siblings below 6 years of age, with an average of 2.3. The largest household conditional mean, standardized by its conditional standard error. The reason why we use this alternative de…nition is linked to the problem of extreme values, which is potentially present for the variable of interest in our sample. Both the median and the interquartile interval are less sensitive to this problem than respectively the mean and the standard error. We check the robustness of our results to this alternative zscore. 9 A household is considered as "poor" if it is living below the country's poverty line. 1 0 This …gure plots the estimated coe¢ cients of the birth order -and their 95% con…dence interval -from a reduced form household …xed e¤ect linear regression. The dependant variable is the zscore and explanatory variables are dummies of birth order only. 1 1 The number of observations related to households characteristics is the number of households in the sample. The mean of a dummy variable represents a proportion. The dummy poor is de…ned according to the poverty line of the country. comprises 13 children, the average is around 3.8. We have shown in section 2 that household wealth is determinant in the decision regarding child discrimination. Empirically measuring household wealth in developing countries is rather problematic. We proxy household wealth by the predicted household expenditures per capita. Current expenditures per capitaIt is household's annual expenditures (housing, food, health care,...) divided by the household size. is …rst estimated as a function of a set of long term variables including parental education, assets owned, professional activity of the parents, and regional dummies. The …tted values are then used as an independent variable measuring household wealth in a behavioral household equation. This wealth proxy is further normalized so that its value for the poorest household in the data is zero. Finally, on the basis on the poverty line criterion, our sample is composed of 35% of poor households.
The empirical model
The main prediction of Section 2 is that in poor households, …rstborn children have reached a smaller education level compared to later-borns, while this discrimination does not occur in wealthier households. We test this prediction using the education zscore presented in the previous subsection as dependant variable. The speci…cation is based on the following …xed e¤ect model:
where BO i;j is a set of three birth order dummies (…rst born, second born, third born, the reference being fourth or later born), HW j is household j's indicator of wealth and C i;j are control variables. This normalization allows us to interpret as the e¤ect of birth order in the poorest household. The control variables C i;j are the child's age, gender and number of younger brothers and sisters. The term j captures a household-speci…c …xed e¤ect. It accounts for household unobserved heterogeneity and household characteristics common to all children: parental education and professional activity, living area, as well as preferences on children's education,... The predictions of the theoretical model can be translated into the following tests:
1. In "poor" households, …rst born children reach relatively lower levels of human capital. H 0 : 1 = 0 H A : 1 < 0 where 1 , the …rst element of the vector , relates to the …rst born child. Under the null, being the …rst born has no impact, while under the alternative, being the …rst born implies a worse performance than that of a fourth or later born.
2. As household wealth increases, the role of birth order on schooling is attenuated. H 0 : 1 = 0 H A : 1 > 0 Under the null, wealth does not a¤ect the impact of birth order on schooling.
Under the alternative, the negative e¤ect of being a …rst born is attenuated by household wealth.
We further check whether the discrimination between children is sorted according to birth order. To say it di¤erently, does the discrimination progressively diminish from the …rst to the fourth born ( 1 < 2 < 3 < 0) ? Or is only the …rst born a¤ected by this discrimination ( 2 = 3 = 0) ?
Empirical results
We study the role of the order of birth on children's educational attainments at a given age. We present here the most important results, based on regressions using the birth order dummies. We study the whole sample as well as distinct urban from rural areas. Further, we check the robustness of these results in several dimensions. In each of them, we are able to con…rm the predictions of our theoretical model.
Main results
We estimate model (M1) on rural and urban households as well as on the unrestricted sample. Results are provided in Table 2 . The coe¢ cient on …rst born is signi…cantly negative. This means that at a given age, being the …rst born child in a poor household makes the child perform worse (compared to the median level of children of the same age) than if he/she were the fourth born or more. Secondly, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term between …rst born and household wealth is signi…cantly positive. This means that the negative e¤ect of being the …rst born is less strong as the household's wealth increases. Since HW equals 4 for the richest household, one can easily see that for a su¢ ciently rich household, being among the …rst born children no longer implies a poorer education level. It may even imply a relatively better education level. Interestingly, boys do not seem to have a relatively higher education level than girls: neither the interactions with birth order nor the gender dummy are signi…-cant. The use of age dummies allows us to make sure that our birth order e¤ects do not incorporate an age or cohort e¤ect. These dummies are negative and signi…-cant. We interpret these values in the following way: as age increases, the mean education level (conditional on age) increases less fast than the median education level (conditional on age). This is because, as time passes, risks of drop out or failure increase. These risks lower the value of the mean, while the median is less a¤ected. Finally, the results seem robust to the urban -rural distinction. A few remarks have to be made however. While in the whole sample as well as in the urban subsample, the coe¢ cients of the birth order dummies are ordered in the expected way (c 1 < c 2 < c 3 < 0), this is not the case in the rural subsample. In the latter, 0 > c 1 > c 2 : although the …rst born is less educated than a fourth or later born, the second born seems to be in the worst position in rural areas. The magnitude of the wealth e¤ect on birth order also seems stronger there. Table 3 and 4 present coe¢ cient estimates of equations with alternative measures of the birth order, namely the absolute and relative birth orders. In these regressions, the coe¢ cients of birth order are positive: as the order of birth increases (for instance from the …rst born to the second born), the educational zscore increases. The interaction term between birth order and wealth has an opposite e¤ect, con…rming our previous results. Regarding gender, it seems to have an impact, but only in rural areas.
Robustness checks
Another issue that was pointed out in our introduction to the data is that if some children have migrated before the date of the survey, our measure of birth order might be ‡awed. Table 5 presents coe¢ cient estimates of equation (M1) after exclusion of households in which there has been a migration for the last …ve years. Results are very robust to this subsampling procedure.
We also look at the robustness of our results to changes in the sample based on fertility characteristics. More precisely, we do the regressions on subsamples where the head of the household is at most 40 years of age, and also where he is at least 50. While in the …rst case, fertility need not be fully accomplished, it could be considered as …xed in the second. The fact that results are extremely similar in both subsamples should be a good sign that fertility is not an issue in our analysis. Finally, we also use alternative measures of wealth: estimated expenditures per capita, value of land owned, housing expenditures,...
Concluding remarks
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the role of birth order in the household allocation of work and schooling across children in developing countries. Our simple model shows that unless the household is su¢ ciently wealthy so that it is not credit constrained, the pressure on resources at the time when only the …rst born child is able to work leads parents to invest less in the education of the …rst born. This result is robust to the introduction of various extensions. One example is the possibility that adolescent -potentially working-children coexist in the household for one period in a model where children stay three periods (with two productive periods) in the household instead of two. The introduction of bequests that might relax inequalities between children does not change our result neither. Our empirical results con…rm that earlier born children receive less education. Furthermore, we …nd that wealthier households do not make use of birth order to discriminate between children's education levels than poor ones. These results are robust to various measures of the birth order. Finally, the literature on the impact of birth order has up to now provided con ‡ict-ing conclusions. Until recently, the common view was that earlier born children receive more education that their younger siblings. A new trend suggests the opposite conclusion. In this paper, we bring some new insights to this discussion by highlighting the impact of parental wealth. We show that poor households provide their elder children with less education, while richer families do not discriminate. Our empirical results suggest that the richest parents might even favor the education of the earlier born. This result might provide a link between the con ‡icting trends in this literature. 0.35 2560 The number of observations related to households characteristics is the number of households in the sample. The mean of a dummy variable represents a proportion. The dummy poor is de…ned according to the poverty line of the country. 
